The axioms of rational choice or revealed preference under certainty include reflexivity, completeness and transitivity ( Austen-Smith and Banks 1999). They provide structural explanation as much as methodologically individualist explanation. In fact, as we shall see, whilst we can interpret political economy models in behavioral terms, they can more plausibly be seen as providing structural constraints or incentives for agents to behave within certain bounds. In fact, the modern critics of classical economic methods, behavioral economists, are the true methodological individualists, with the claim that human agents do not behave with the consistency that classical economics assumes.
Karl Popper (1957: 136) was probably the first to link methodological individualism with economic methods, mis-citing Friedrich Hayek as his source (Hayek was actually saying that economics ought to be methodologically individualist, not that it is). The tenets of “methodological individualism” are also usually associated with rational choice models. Normatively an agent can be consistently irrational or unreasonable, but as long as they are consistent then their behavior can be modeled. We might be able to predict the behavior of an agent, be it a person or an institution, without considering that behavior to be in the least reasonable, prudent or sensible. They actually have very little to do with “rationality” or reasonableness as normally understood. These principles – usually called “rationality assumptions” – can be considered normative desiderata for consistent behavior. Underlying political economy models are axiomatic principles that enable deductive model building and formally derived hypotheses. Sometimes termed “positive political theory,” because its aim is to explain political behavior rather than tell us how we should run our political regimes (which is the job of normative political philosophy), it nevertheless has a strongly normative bent. This item appears in the following Collection(s)ĭoctoral dissertations submitted to the Graduate School by Ball State University doctoral candidates in partial fulfillment of degree requirements.Political economy, in studies of voter and party behavior, usually refers to a specific method: the economic or rational choice method. There are no files associated with this item.
Voting blocs and behaviors full#
Show full item record Files in this item Files This study also found that percent yes vote change was negative for elections held during expansionary times and slightly positive for elections held during recessionary times.None of the factors considered accounted for significant amounts of variance in the dependent variable. Additional findings suggest that 1) schools will continue to have a difficult time passing school referenda questions, 2) factors influencing core voting bloc movement are similar for females and males, 3) older voters are too heterogeneous in their voting behaviors to be viewed as a single voting bloc, 4) voters who experience a higher incidence of property tax liability tend to oppose school referenda elections, 5) questions placed on the ballot during periods of traditionally large turnout have a higher likelihood of success than those placed during periods of low turnout, 6) low-profile campaign strategies do not increase the likelihood of school referenda election success, and 7) perceptions of school affiliation significantly affect the likelihood of success. The drop off rate of voters when core voting bloc strength is increasing is not a mirror image of the influx rate experienced when core voting bloc strength is diluted. The dependent variable, percent yes vote change, was measured at the precinct level.Findings suggest that the effect of turnout is problematic. The research also examined the factors of election timing, campaign strategy, school affiliation, and voter gender, age, and residence.The sample consisted of the majority of all school referenda elections held in a three-county area of west-central Ohio during the period 1988 to 1991. Core voting bloc movement was defined as the change in the ratio of voters who voted in contiguous school referenda elections relative to voters who voted in only one election. This study examined the relationships between core voting bloc movement and success on school referenda elections.
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